Abstract. Fingerprinting codes are used to prevent dishonest users (traitors) from redistributing digital contents. In this context, codes with the traceability (TA) property and codes with the identifiable parent property (IPP) allow the unambiguous identification of traitors. The existence conditions for IPP codes are less strict than those for TA codes. In contrast, IPP codes do not have an efficient decoding algorithm in the general case. Other codes that have been widely studied but possess weaker identification capabilities are separating codes. It is a well-known result that a TA code is an IPP code, and an IPP code is a separating code. The converse is in general false. However, it has been conjectured that for Reed-Solomon codes all three properties are equivalent. In this paper we investigate this equivalence, providing a positive answer when the number of traitors divides the size of the ground field.
Introduction
Distributing digital contents is an activity which is prone to an undesirable attack: unauthorized redistributions performed by dishonest users. To fight against this, the distributor can apply the fingerprinting technique. This technique consists in making each copy of the content unique by embedding a mark before delivering it. The embedding process must satisfy several properties. First, the process must be robust. This means that it should not be possible to remove or degrade the mark once it is embedded without rendering the content unusable. Second, the marked content must not differ substantially from the original content and must retain the same functionality.
The distributor assigns a unique mark to each user, and delivers the marked content correspondingly. In other words, the users will receive different objects that will have identical appearance from their perspective. Due to the uniqueness of the objects, they are discouraged from redistributing their own copy. However, several dishonest users, called traitors, may form a coalition, compare their copies and create a pirated copy. This is known as a collusion attack. The underlying idea is that the mark contained in the pirated copy hides the identity of the traitors. What is worse, that mark could coincide with that of a user outside the coalition and frame that innocent user. A traitor tracing scheme should be prudently designed so that this situation never happens ideally, or it happens with arbitrarily small probability. A stronger traitor tracing scheme would provide, besides that, a mechanism to identify at least one of the traitors. This goal is achieved if the set of marks chosen by the distributor constitutes a code with tracing properties. Such codes are also known as fingerprinting codes and the marks are called fingerprints.
Codes with tracing properties can be classified according to their capabilities in terms of protecting innocent users and identifying traitors. These properties are not equivalent in the general case. However, in this paper we show the equivalence of some of these properties for numerous families of Reed-Solomon codes.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the topic and the notation, and present some previous results. In Section 3 we present the main results of the paper, showing the equivalence of some tracing properties for Reed-Solomon codes, when the coalition size divides the size of the ground field. Next, in Section 4 we provide an illustrative example and a table summarizing the results. Finally we present the conclusions.
Definitions and background
Let F q be the finite field of q elements, where q = p m for some prime number p and some integer m ≥ 1. We denote the vectors of n coordinates over F q in boldface, e.g. a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ F n q . The (Hamming) distance between two vectors
Let C ⊆ F n q be the (n, M, d)-fingerprinting code chosen by the distributor. Recall that every codeword in C uniquely identifies a user. In a collusion attack several traitors compare their copies. Since fighting against arbitrary-size coalitions is a very hard problem, the maximum size of the coalition is usually upper bounded by a constat c ≥ 2. Since the copies of the traitors have different fingerprints, say t 1 , . . . , t c ∈ C, they will be able to detect a number of differences in several locations. Using this information, the traitors are free to generate a pirated copy which is different from their copies.
We remark that the locations of the content chosen by the distributor to embed the fingerprint are the same for every copy. Hence, the differences spotted by the traitors are where two of their assigned fingerprints differ. Also, no information about the fingerprint can be gained from locations where the fingerprint is not embedded. Hence, it becomes sufficient to study only the fingerprints assigned to the users. Definition 1. Let C be an (n, M, d)-code over F q and let T = {t 1 , . . . , t c } ⊆ C be a subset (coalition) of c codewords. We say that coordinate i is undetectable for coalition T if t 1,i = t 2,i = · · · = t c,i . If this condition is not satisfied, we say that coordinate i is detectable.
It is customary to assume that undetectable coordinates remain unchanged in the pirated copy. This is known as the marking assumption [2, 3] . The motivation for this assumption arises from applications to protecting software, where modifying arbitrary locations may damage the content. For the case of the detectable coordinates, the coalition can set them to any arbitrary value of F q , or even make them unreadable.
Recall that the goal of the distributor consists in identifying one of the members of a coalition that generated a pirated copy. If the only restriction in the generation of the pirated word is the marking assumption, then identification with zero-error probability is not possible [2, 3] . Definition 2. Let C be an (n, M, d)-code over F q and let T = {t 1 , . . . , t c } ⊆ C be a subset of c codewords. We say that x ∈ F n q is a descendant of T if for each coordinate 1 ≤ i ≤ n there exists a t j ∈ T such that x i = t j,i . We call t j a parent of x. The set of all the descendants of T is denoted desc(T ), that is
The set of descendants that we have just introduced is also known as the narrowsense envelope by some authors [1] . Assuming that the set of pirated words that a coalition T can generate is desc(T ), then identification with zero-error probability is possible. Observe that T ⊆ desc(T ), and that T ⊆ T implies desc(T ) ⊆ desc(T ). Hence, solving the identification problem for coalitions of size exactly c also solves the problem for coalitions of any size c ≤ c. Definition 3. Let C be a code, and let A, B ⊆ C be two disjoint subsets of size c 1 and c 2 respectively:
Similarly as in [17] , we denote θ(A, B) the number of separating coordinates between the disjoint subsets A and B. Whenever θ(A, B) = 0, we say that the pair (A, B) is a (c 1 , c 2 )-nonseparated configuration. Also, for a code C, we denote θ c1,c2 the smallest value θ(A, B) attained for disjoint subsets A, B ⊆ C of size c 1 and c 2 respectively. Although in general θ(A, B) is not a metric in the mathematical sense of the term, clearly, θ 1,1 is the minimum distance of the code.
The values θ c1,c2 will be useful in the characterization of codes with tracing properties.
by many authors [17, 14, 16, 12, 6, 7] . Relationships with similar concepts have also been shown. See for example overviews [17, 6] .
Recently, more attention has been paid to separating codes in connection with digital fingerprinting. In the crypto literature, (c, 1)-and (c, c)-separating codes are also known as c-frameproof codes and c-secure frameproof codes, respectively [21, 20] .
The connection between separating and fingerprinting codes is quite straightforward. Assume that a fingerprinting code has the (c, 1)-separating property. Then no coalition of size ≤ c will be able to generate a pirated word that coincides with the fingerprint of an innocent user. Moreover, using a (c, c)-separating code, the coalition can not even claim that the pirated word was generated by a disjoint coalition of size ≤ c.
Still, the separating property is not enough to achieve unambiguous identification of traitors. To see this, consider the case c = 2 and the code
one cannot decide which of the three possible pairs of codewords is the actual coalition of traitors that generated the pirated word (0, 1, 0). Now, we present sufficient conditions to allow identification with zero-error probability.
Note that for an IPP code the intersection of all coalitions of size ≤ c that can generate a given pirated word is nonempty. In particular, the codewords that lie the intersection (1) belong to the coalition that generated the pirated word and can be accused as traitors. Hence, for a code of size M , the identification process runs in time O( M c ) in the general case. Definition 6. A code C has the c-traceability property (c-TA) if for all subsets T ⊆ C of size at most c, if
That is, in a c-TA code the closest codeword to a descendant of a subset (coalition) T , in terms of Hamming distance, is in T .
It is easy to see that every TA code is an IPP code. The main benefit of using TA codes is that the identification process runs in time O(M ). Nevertheless the TA property imposes more restrictions to the code than the IPP property; see for example [20] .
The concepts of IPP and TA codes were originated in [4] (later in [5] ), however no specific name was given to such codes. IPP codes where further studied in [10] . There the authors coined the term "IPP," that has been widely adopted in the crypto literature. Also, IPP and TA codes have been investigated in [20] under the names presented here.
A simple sufficient condition for an (n, M, d)-code to posses the TA property was presented in [4, 5] . Namely, if d > (1 − 1/c 2 )n, the code is c-TA. In addition, the following chain of implications are also well-known results:
These results were presented later in the form of a theorem in [20] .
2.1. MDS codes with tracing properties. Codes that achieve equality in the Singleton bound, M ≤ q n−d+1 , are called maximum distance separable (MDS) codes. Therefore, linear MDS codes satisfy k = n − d + 1.
Even though the results (2) are well-known and obvious, it took several years to prove the converse of the first and second implication for linear MDS codes. This result first appeared in [11] .
2 )n.
Putting this together with (2), we have that for linear MDS codes
A well-known family of linear MDS codes are Reed-Solomon codes [15] . We first give the following definition.
Definition 7. Let P = {p 1 , . . . , p n } be a subset of n elements of F q , called evaluation points. We define the [n,
Note that G(n, k) is a linear MDS code, irrespective of the choice of the set of evaluation points. If P is the multiplicative group of the ground field, F * q , then G(n, k) is known as Reed-Solomon code, denoted RS(n, k). If P = F q , then it is known as extended Reed-Solomon code.
In [18, 19] , the authors posed the following question, which has motivated our work in this paper. In fact, we will see below that, for many families of Reed-Solomon codes, the condition d ≤ (1 − 1/c 2 )n implies not only losing the c-IPP property, but also losing the (c, c)-separating property. Hence, the converse of all the implications in (2) holds for such families.
The observation that we have just made suggests a generalization of the previous question as follows.
Question 2. Is it the case that
2 )n for all (c, c)-separating G(n, k) codes of Definition 7 of length n and minimum distance d?
Observe that for the same subset of evaluation points and any k ≤ k, we have G(n, k ) ⊆ G(n, k) ⊆ F n q . Therefore, to provide a positive answer to the question above, we only need to show that G(n, k = n/c 2 + 1) has θ c,c = 0, for every possible pair of values q and c, and every possible choice of evaluation points.
The motivation of these questions arises from the fact that the amount of information (fingerprint) that we can embed in a digital document is limited. Assume that we can embed no more than n symbols from F q . Then, there exists a c-TA Reed-Solomon code that can allocate q k users, for any k < n/c 2 + 1. For the same value of n, if the distributor needs to allocate more users, then by Theorem 1 the code will not be c-TA. In this situation, is there a chance that we can still identify traitors? The remark made above suggests that for k ≥ n/c 2 + 1 there are neither c-IPP nor (c, c)-separating codes, hence identification with zero-error probability would not be possible.
In this paper we are mainly concerned with giving an answer to these questions when G(n, k) is a Reed-Solomon code. However, we will also exploit the constructions presented to give some answers for other G(n, k) codes.
Previous results.
An answer to the questions above for the case c = 2 can be found in [17] . It is written there that in 1986 G. D. Katsman and S. N. Litsyn applied Mattson-Solomon polynomials and linearized polynomials to Reed-Solomon codes obtaining θ 2,2 = n − 4(k − 1). Taking k ≥ n/4+1, we have θ 2,2 = 0. Therefore (2, 2)-separating ⇒ d > (1−1/4)n, which means that the converse of every implication in (2) holds for Reed-Solomon codes and the particular case c = 2. Unfortunately, the proof of this nice result has not been published.
Also, in [18, 19] a custom-made construction of G(n, k) codes is presented, defined over sufficiently large alphabets. They have minimum distance d = (1 − 1/c 2 )n and they are not (c, c)-separating. Nevertheless, no specific relation is given between the code parameters.
In [8] a related result is presented for Reed-Solomon codes RS(n, k) such that their ground field contains the (k − 1)th roots of unity. The idea there was to restate the separating condition algebraically, as a system of equations. From [8, Theorem 7] , and from the proof provided by the authors, the following corollary is immediate. 
Equivalence of the tracing properties of Reed-Solomon codes
We begin by showing some upper and lower bounds of θ c1,c2 for linear and MDS codes. These bounds were presented for the particular cases c 1 = c 2 = 2 in [17] , and c 1 = 1, c 2 arbitrary in [11] . Lemma 1. Let C be an [n, k, d]-code and let c 1 , c 2 be two positive integers. Then,
If C is additionally an MDS code and c 1 , c 2 ≥ 2, then
Proof. Let T 1 , T 2 be any two disjoint subsets of C of size c 1 and c 2 respectively. Note that two different codewords of C agree in at most n − d coordinates. Also, the maximum number of coordinates where the codewords of two disjoint subsets of C have a common element (nonseparating coordinates) is n − θ c1,c2 . Hence, for every codeword t ∈ T 1 , the codewords in T 2 can agree together in at most c 2 (n − d) coordinates of t. Since T 1 has c 1 elements, we have that n − θ c1,c2 ≤ c 1 c 2 (n − d), which proves the lower bounds.
To prove the upper bounds, construct two subsets T 1 and T 2 in the following way. First, take any t 1 , t 2 ∈ C such that d(t 1 , t 2 ) = d. Such codewords exist, by definition of minimum distance. Put t 1 into T 1 and t 2 into T 2 . For the remaining c 1 − 1 codewords of T 1 , choose codewords such that agree with t 2 in k − 1 disjoint coordinates, in the positions where t 1 and t 2 differ. This can be done by virtue of [11, Lemma 2.2] . Operate in the same way for the codewords of the set T 2 . Therefore, the number of coordinates where the elements of T 1 and T 2 have a common element is n − d + (c 1 + c 2 − 2)(k − 1), which proves the upper bound in (3). Moreover, if the code is MDS and c 1 , c 2 ≥ 2, we can set an additional coordinate of every codeword of T 2 \ {t 2 } to agree with a coordinate of a given codeword t 1 ∈ T 1 \ {t 1 }. Similarly, we can set an additional coordinate of each codeword of T 1 \ {t 1 , t 1 } to agree with a coordinate of any other codeword in T 2 \ {t 2 }. This reduces the number of nonseparating coordinates in c 1 + c 2 − 3, and proves the upper bound in (4) .
Consider the case c 1 = c 2 = c. For linear MDS codes, and from the previous lemma, it is clear that whenever d − 2(c − 1)(k − 1) − 2c + 3 ≤ 0, we have θ c,c = 0. Therefore the code is not (c, c)-separating. Also, when d − (c 2 − 1)(n − d) > 0, then θ c,c > 0 and the code is (c, c)-separating. In fact, the latter condition implies that the code is c-TA. In conclusion, there is an "uncertainty interval," in terms of d, in which the (c, c)-separating property remains to be characterized, namely
3.1. Cyclic codes with multiplicative subgroups in the ground field. Whenever the set of evaluation points P is a multiplicative subgroup with generator element α, the code G(n, k) is (linearly equivalent to) a cyclic code. We denote by t (i) the cyclic rotation of t ∈ F n q in i coordinates to the right. In this case, it is easy to see that if the polynomial f (x) generates the codeword t ∈ G(n, k), the polynomial f (α −i x) generates the codeword t (i) . The following result, together with (2), generalizes Corollary 1 for any G(n, k) code generated with a multiplicative subgroup of evaluation points. Proposition 1. Let P be a multiplicative subgroup of F * q . Also, let G(n, k) be the code from Definition 7 generated with the set of evaluation points P , of minimum distance d. If n − d divides n and d ≤ (1 − 1/c 2 )n, then the code is not (c, c)-separating.
Proof. We need to show that under the conditions stated the code contains a (c, c)-nonseparated configuration.
Denote r = n/(k − 1), and consider the polynomial
where α is a generator of P . Note that f (x) is a polynomial of degree k − 1. Hence, the codeword generated from f (x), say t, is in G(n, k). It is easy to see that f (α −rh x) = f (x) for any integer h. Hence, t (rh) = t. This, together with the fact that the polynomial has degree k − 1, means that the codeword t consists of k − 1 concatenations of a vector of r distinct elements, say b = (b 1 , . . . , b r ). Now take c = min{c, r} ≤ c and construct the following set of codewords:
From the starting assumptions, n − d = k − 1 ≥ n/c 2 , which implies that |T 1 | = r/c ≤ c ≤ c. Since t is the repeated concatenation of the vector b, of length r, and c r/c ≥ r, it is clear that for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, there exists a codeword t (ic ) in T 1 such that t It is well-known [18, 19] that c-IPP codes over F q do not exist for c ≥ q. The previous corollary gives a tighter bound for the case of Reed-Solomon codes.
3.2.
Coalition size dividing the ground field size. This section contains the main result of our paper, which comes in the form of the following theorem. In fact, from the proof of the theorem, one can easily see that it is valid for any code G(n, k) with an arbitrary set of evaluation points P of size q − c 2 < |P | ≤ q. The proof is based on a special class of polynomials known as linearized polynomials.
Definition 8. A polynomial of the form
Let us present some important, well-known facts [13] 
for all α, β ∈ F q m and all a, b ∈ F q . Thus, the polynomial function L :
, is a linear operator on F q m over F q . Also, the following result will be useful in our proof below.
Theorem 3 ([13, Theorem 3.52]). Let U be a vector subspace of F q m over F q . Then for any nonnegative integer s, the polynomial
For our purposes, we will deal with linearized polynomials over F q = F p m such that their roots also lie in F q . We are now in position to prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove the theorem by finding a (c, c)-nonseparated configuration again.
If c 2 > q, the code is not (c, c)-separating by Corollary 2. Henceforth, we shall assume that c 2 ≤ q = p m . This, together with the fact that c divides q, implies that c 2 also divides q, that is c = p r for some r ≤ m/2. For any n such that q − c 2 < n ≤ q, and from the fact that d ≤ (1 − 1/c 2 )n, we have that the code contains, at least, all the codewords generated from polynomials of any degree up to q/c 2 = p m−2r . Now, consider the polynomial
where U is a vector subspace of F q over F p of dimension m − 2r and size q/c 2 . Note that L(x) is a linearized polynomial by Theorem 3. Also, from (5), the polynomial function L : F q → F q is an homomorphism with | ker L| = q/c 2 and | im L| = c 2 . Clearly, im L is a vector subspace of F q of dimension 2r. Now, take a vector subspace B ⊆ im L of dimension r and size c. Regard B as an additive subgroup of F q and consider its c cosets, which partition im L:
We can assume without loss of generality that β 1 = 0. Now consider the following c polynomials
The fact that the c cosets B i partition im L into disjoint subsets implies that there is only one f i (x) satisfying this condition. Now, consider the set of codewords
where t i is the codeword generated from the polynomial f i (x), and the set of c constant codewords T 2 = {(b, . . . , b) : b ∈ B}, Obviously, T 1 and T 2 are disjoint, because deg f i (x) ≥ 1. Also, θ(T 1 , T 2 ) = 0, which proves that the code is not (c, c)-separating.
This construction applies whenever the code contains, at least, all the codewords generated from polynomials of degree up to q/c 2 . Since k − 1 ≥ (q − 1)/c 2 , this happens in particular for the Reed-Solomon code. Finally, we remark that one can choose an arbitrary coset β i + B for the generation of the constant codewords of the set T 2 .
However, there are other families of Reed-Solomon codes that can benefit from the constructions of the nonseparated configuration presented in the previous proof. Proposition 2. Let RS(n, k) be a Reed-Solomon code over F q with minimum distance d. If Proof. Note that the code contains codewords generated from polynomials of degree at least q/c 2 = q/c 2 . Also, c and c 2 must divide q, which is implied by (6) . Using the construction from the proof of Theorem 2, one can easily see that the code is not (c , c )-separating. The proof follows by noting that c ≤ c.
3.3.
Summary of results for Reed-Solomon codes. We summarize here the results shown in the paper for the case of Reed-Solomon codes, RS(n, k). 
